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Indonesian
Fundamentalism?
By: Jamhari
aoing beingforgotten for so long, Islam in Southeast Asia, since
the B1s, has come to tbe fore. Southeast Asian Muslim, consid-
ered as different, unortltodox, syncretic and marginal, wbo do
not speak and urite Arabic, noru plwnder the academic world with a uealth
oariety of Islamic expressions. The dffirence is no more vieued as a dez,i-
ance than as strength of Islam in accommodating tbe local cwltwres and
traditions. Tlte long process of Islamization of Southeast Asia, mainly
tbrough trading actiaities and Sufi.sm, provides an experience for Islam of
patience and appreciation zaben encountering tbe dffirence. Southeast
Asian.Islam bas been identified ruith peace and dialog.
Islam in Soutbeast Asia provides an example of hou a religion devel-
ops ruitbin a community zuitb a wide variety of etbnic groups. Instead of
pusbing tbe local cuhures and traditions aside, Islam opens up itself to
them and incorporates them into the r.ercb of uniz,ersal klam. Now one
cdn see the difference of klamic expressions in Melayw, Aceh, Bugis, Banten,
lava, Bugis, Sunda, Patani, Mindanau, Brunai, etc.
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Being localized, Sowtheast Asian klam does not close its self to the glo-
bal cuhures and ciailization. Its relationsbip rpith tbe Middle East, tbe
homeland of Islam, is still raell maintained, but the neru and fresb rela-
rionship ruitb tbe West is ako developed. Wile the graduates of tbe Middle
East preoiously dominated the Islamic discourse, nor.u it also inpoh;es tbe
Western graduates. As a resuh, Southeast Asian Islam is noru familiar
utitb, and eaen made a significant contribution to, global issues suclt as
ciail society, democraqt, gender, buman rights and good gooernance.
Tl'te face of peace, tolerant, moderate and modern Soutbeast Asian Is-
lam is shaken by the rise of radical klam. Now Southeast Asia, particu-
larly Indonesia the most important Muslim country in tbe region, be-
comes tlte nest of Islamic terrorism. til'bat can one explain?
Contrary to robat one might tbink, modernization does not bring re-
ligions to an end. Rational forces, science and technology and material
satisfaction do not marginalized, let alone eliminate, spiritwal mJstery.
Instead, tlte zaord now reitnesses the increasingreligious dedications among
religiows commwnities. Tltey spend more and more time in mosques or
religious gathering and actiaities. "Reaival" or "rediscoaery" of religion
are sometimes used to explain tbese phenomena. Horaever, having a bigb
commitment to religious doctrines, some zealous follou.,ers fall into
militanism. Islamic militanism in Lebanon and Palestine, Zionism in
Israel and tbe militant Catbolics and Protestants in Northern Island are
only some of the examples.
Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Maryarakat (Center for the Stwdy of Is-
lam and Society) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta hai done a national
u.tide research to understand the current religious phbnomena in Indone-
sia. TIte suruey, done in 2001, confi.rms tlte strengtbening attacbment of
Indonesian Muslims to Islam. Wile the execution of santri religious ritu-
als (such as fasting during Ramadhan, prayingfi.ve times a day and pray
before starting working) increases, the abangan practices (such as giaing
ritual offering burning incense and asking suggestion from a shaman)
decrease. (Some of the findings 'were published by Tempo 29 December
2001). Among other tbings, the findings can drazu some light on the raise
of Islamic political parties during the 1999 general election and the long
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debates, that folloru tbe election, on the implementation of tbe shari'ah
lau in Indonesia and on uthether or not to reinstate the Jakarta Cbarter,
particularly tbe zaords "uitb tlte obligation of thefollouers of Islam to pwt
Islamic Shari'ah into effect" in the UUD 45.
A year later PPIM did anotber researcb with bigger sample (n 2001
research only 15 provinces zuere included, in 2002 all provinces utere in-
cluded) and it shows tbat tbe strengtbening of religious attachment coin-
cides uith the increasingtendenqt offundamentalism. More people agree
utith tbe application of klamic gouernrnent. (Compare the research fi'nd-
ings in Tempo 31 December 2001 andTempo 29 December 2002. The
full outpwt of the researclt is being processed for publication in a book
form). Wile the majority of Indonesian Muslims are still moderate and
tolerant, tbanks to tbe intportant role played lry mass Muslims organiza-
tion especially Ntl and Muhammadiyah, the increasing tendency totttard
fundamentalism begs an explanation. After the collapse of tbe Neu Order
fundamentalism fi.nds its uay gradually into the public sphere. It seems
that the suppression of any social and political, as zaell as ideological,
mopenl.ents detrimental to the Neru Order establisbment had created a
time bomb.
Follozuing up the previous fi.ndings, PPIM undertakes another researcb
and this time special attention is given tofundamentalism. Needles to say
that neitber is 'fundamentalism," nor other interchangeable terrns such
as "ntilitant Islam" "radicalism" and "repioalism", capable of fully d*
scribing such a conl.plex pbenomena. They are not tbe terms used by the
followers of this groups for themsel'ues and, therefore, pejoratiae. None'
theless, in this research uue still employ these terms to refer to "Islamic
group(s) whose fanaticism and ideological basis are intensely geared to-
utards rElacing tbe existing aalue system in society." In the name of de-
m.ocracy and freedom of expresions, thqt hold buge demonstration espe'
cially in big cities like Jakarta, Bandung and Yogtakarta, and, if neces-
sary, they employ plrysical force as fti.eans of achieving tbeir goals.
The purpose of tbe research is to achiepe a comprehensipe and incisipe
description of the radical Islamic ftioaernents in Indonesia, and to iden-
tifii key features, cbaracteristics, organizations, vdlues, potencies and net-
r.enrks utithin tbis moztement. Furtbermore, it is also aimed at analyzing
their interpretation and understanding of religion, and their response to
sucb contemporary issues as religious pluralism, leadersbip, political af'
filiations, buman nghtt gender and good gooernnTent. Wile religious
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understanding is considered epitome, the research will ako put ernpbasis
on tbe diaersity of social and economic background of both radical Islam
and religious establishment to rahich tbe radical Islam opposed. Their in-
terpretation and understanding uill be analyzed from parious non-reli-
gious perspectives. This is important since religious understanding is in
fact a response to the surrounding social setting.
Tbe follozuing questions are to be answered: r)lben and bor.r.t were tbe
groups and moaements establishedl rJ/bat is tbe nature of tbe movements
(including issues of exclusioity and inclusioeness)? Do tbq represent or
folloru the concepts of similar nLo'uernents previously existed? Do tbqt ac-
tioely engage or, on the contrd.ry, ruithdrazu from tbe public life? If they
are reactiae, to ruhat and to uhom are tbeir reactions directed? Do tbey
hazte cbarismatic leaders? If they rely on religious references swch as the
Holy Scripture, hotu are tltese references interpreted and applied? Horu do
they respond to otber religious groups? How do thqt respond to the rights
of otber beliepers? Hou do tbey respond to the religious aiolence? Hou do
thqt respond to good governance? How do tbqt react to tbe existing eco-
nomic, social and political situation? l{/hat do they perceioe to be tbe ideal
economic, social and political structure? Do thqt perceive politics to be a
part ofreligious life? IY/ho they deem appropriate to lead the country? Hora
do tbey perceive bistory and human freedom? tVltere do tbey get their
inspiration?
There are grounds to sdy tbat fundamentalism is part of the religious
tradition. There zaill altaays be some follor.t,ers zabo choose tbe strictest
and the rnost rigid interpretation of the scripture, just like those who choose
tbe loosest interpretation of itr^Frorn this perspective, the actors of Bali
blast, as utell as September 11"' eoent, ruill aluays fi.nd justifications for
their actions in tlte scripture or prophetic traditions. And it its self it is not
neza. Looking back ii the hisiory of modern Indonesia, one can see the
DI/TII movernent. Particularly strongin lVest Jaoa, Aceh and Makassar,
it sought to apply Shari'ah in Indonesia. This idea is not comingfrom
nouhere. As indicated above, religious understanding and interpretation
of tbe scripture is a product of the cornplexity of social, economic and po-
litical realities. (Jnderstanding tbe religious justifications is as important
as understanding social, economic and political background.
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Taking tbese complexities into dccount, ttte choose some of the groups,
zabich haae been so far identifi.ed as fundamentalists. Among tltem are
MtuII (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia) FPI (Front Pembela klam)and FKAWJ
(Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah lVal Jama'ah). In rerms of the applica'
tion of Shari'ah in Indonesia, there is no signifi'cant dffirence aTnong
them. Hozpever, one sbould be azaare of their differences to tbe extent that
tbey often dislike eacb otber. Each group has its oun background and
raison d'etre.The trigger of their formation also aaries, and tbat include
political eoents at national leztel and Muslims'Christians conflict in some
areas in Indonesia. Four tdrget groups zaill be thefocus ofthe researcb: (1)
tbe elite and influential groups, (2) the organization in tbe ntovement,
including tbeir oision and actiaities, (3) members and follouters, and (4)
their netzuork.
Declared in August 200 in Yogyakarta by thousands of Muslims
tbrougbout Indonesia, also attended by foreigner delegates, WII's main
agenda is to establislr Shari'ah. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir raas elected as tbe
amir (chiefl of MMI. Aiming at establishing an Islamic state, thqt con-
ceizte tbemselpes as the heirs of DI/TII moaement and it is not unexpected
tbat the folloraers of DI/TII joint the camp. [Jnlike other fundamentalist
groups, for exanTples FPI and Lasykar Jihad, WII choose politic and aca-
demic cbannek as pelticles to acltieoe the goal. Seminars, books, pampblets,
Int ern e t, I o bby ing p o I itic ians in p arl iam ents, and th e I ik e ar e am o ng tlt e ir
activities. Altbough WII utas establisbed as a kind of joint-office for all
people or pdrties (regardless oftheir geograpbical or state origins) rabo sbare
the same agenda, in realities it is considered, eoen by otber fundamental-
ist groups, as being a distinct group zaitb its ozan agenda. Lately their
amir Abu Bakar Ba'asyir utas arrested, accused of attempting tbe murder
of Megaraati and of beingthe main actor behind bombings in rtaries places
in Indonesia. He is also linked uith tbe Jama'ah Islam of Soutbeast Asia,
an organization that has agenda to destroy lVestern, or, to be precise,
American, facilities in the region.
The FPI's embryo is tbe Pam Suakarsa (a sort of military civil, cipil'
ians recruited by military to do what the police and military do), zahicb
ruas formed to counter balance tlte students' n'tozternents demanding
Habibie's resignments and to secrlre the yearly MPR assembly (meaning,
to ensure that Habibi.e uas not forced to resign). Habibie, the newly ap-
pointed president at the initiation of Soeharto, llrAs viezaed as part of tbe
Ner.et Order. Later on, uthen Habibie's presidenq, could not be defended,
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FPI, under tbe leadership of a young preacber Habib Riziq Sbibab, be-
co?nes a pressure group to remoue the maksiat the religiously bad things
such as prostitutions, pubs and liquor stores. PFI is soon able to catch pub-
lic eyes because of their use of physical aiolence, if necessary, to acbiepe the
goal. As far as tbe application of Shari'ah is concerned, FPI joined the
force to include Jakarta Charter in UUD 45 tbrougb mass mobilization.
Horueoer, their "expertise" is still tbe removal of maksiat, and this is uthat
PFI dffirsfrom otherfundamentalist groups sucb as LJASWJ andMajelis
Mujahidin. Declared in South Jakarta on the day of independent day
August 17 1998,fi.rmly based on the doctrine ofahlussunnah wal-jama'ah,
FPI stick to their main agenda amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (propagate the
good deeds and prohibit the bad ones). For them, supporting tbe applica-
tion of Sharfah does not necessary mean establishing an Islamic State.
They accept tlte current form of Indonesian state. Wat tbey strir.te for is
tbe formation positive larus for Muslims in accordance uith tbe Qwr'an
and the Sunnab.
Tlte main fi.gure bebipd FKAW is Jafar Umar Thalib. Based, and
declared on Febrwary L4"" L999, in Yogyakarta, FKAW is closely linked
witb Jama'ah al-Twrath al-klami, a semi clandestine group ako based in
Yogyakarta. Thanks to the economic, political, social and religious crisis,
KKAW uas born. Like FPI, thqt support the application of Shari'ah in
Indonesia but they do not support the creation of an Islamic state. Their
main concerned is to restore tbe respect of Islam, zuhich zaas destroyed
during the New Order. Their focus is to improve the islamicity of indi-
piduak. Ako like FPI tbey, they support the presidency of Habibie and
considered those rpho opposed bim as being detrimental to Islam, but their
main entry to the national stage in year 2000 is tbeir call for Jihad in
Ambon to help Muslims against Cbristians. Thq formed Lasykar Jibad
and sent them to Maluku on the precept tbat Jibad is a necessity to protect
the nation from the RMS rebellious group, u.tho raere bebind tbe attack
against Muslims.
Mfutl, FPI and FKA\X/J are only tbree a?nong many similar groups
u.torking in Indonesia. They include Darul Islam, Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiab
Islamiab and lkhzaanul Muslimin. But the questions are: Are tbese groups
a natural and normal outconxe of democracy, utbich requires openness
and participation? Are they purely political moeements aiming at politi-
cal and economic gains? Or a cultural rnovernent dgainst modernity? Or
a puppet mopernent to discredit certain other groups? Later, ruben the
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researcb k fully done, hopefully more light can be drawn to these ques-
tions, as rpell as others as stated abope.
Wile in tuaiting going back to the fi.ndings of PPIM researcb in 2001
and 2002, one cannot underestimate the power of moderate groups in
Indonesia. In 20001 about 45% of tbe respondent (or 42% in 2002)Indo-
nesian Muslim feel tbat tbey are Part of NU community, wbile 11% (or
12% in 2002) that of Muhammadiyyah, The fwrther interpretation of the
relevant data from the qwestioner reveal that there is a close relationsbip
bettaeen the attachment of tbe people to the Muslim nASS organizations
and their agreement to ciaility and democracy. Tb, more tbey attaclt to
tbese organizations tbe more they agree to cittic and democratic palues.
Onl.y smalL number of Indonesian Muslim community belongs to radical
groups. It is correct that one only needs a couple of people to explode a
bomb, but to put so much emphasis on the radicalism utilL potentially
look dozan tbe majority, and tbis attitude is counter productive to figbt
against radicalism.
Jamhari, Chair of Center for tbe Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) u
a lecturer at tbe Facuhy of Dakruab, UIN Jalearta.
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